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All in all, the future of the EU social democratic parties very likely depends on how the PSOE will address the migration issue. Familia y sistema de bienestar: Facilitators, middlemen, discrete openings so that both sides could start to talk to — and not scream at — each other again and try to reach a compromise, are these now European dirty words? For this reason, certain measures, such as those used against Greece in , or those applied to Portugal, could not be adopted against Spain, given that the Agreement made no mention of financial or economic cooperation. And so in the end there was no unified call to consult the ambassadors.
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Get to Know Us. English Choose a language for shopping. El pueblo adivasi en la India: Alf Gunvald Nilsen 28 August DemocraciaAbierta 23 August Genevieve LeBaron 23 August Reconocimiento colombiano a Palestina: Adam Fishwick 22 August Derechos humanos e inteligencia artificial: Cadenas globales de suministro: Sharan Burrow 20 August Voces de la cadena de suministro: However it was, of course, not a case of an organised corpus, nor would it be correct to speak of a protocol for a specific course of action. These would be applied to third countries in their relations with the European Community, regardless of whether they were seeking full or associate membership.
Policies were adapted over time and, in the pre-transition period, ranged from political veto to the suspension of ongoing agreements or negotiations, depending on objectives as diverse as moral condemnation, or the consolidation of moderate political alternatives. In the last analysis they responded to the need to establish greater freedom in order to put limits on potential bouts of destabilising activity.
Economic measures were the main tool for monitoring and, to a certain degree, controlling these conditions. Member states and the European institutions were also involved in a more or less subtle game of diplomatic pressure. According to Pridham, 26 criteria of economic and political conditionality were applied.
Economic conditionality was based on making the awarding of certain benefits —aid, advantages, agreements, membership— subject to the fulfilment of a series of conditions. Political conditionality was characterised by applicant States agreeing to principles of freedom, democracy, respect for human rights and the Constitutional State.
On the one hand, the EEC gradually applied pressure by means of diplomatic mechanisms and negotiations; it promoted basic, although not unique, interaction with European countries under its influence and therefore susceptible to integration, once the process of westernisation and Europeanisation had been set in motion. The implementation of democracy, which opened the doors to membership negotiations with the European Community, and which signalled the end of the Transition period, did not automatically mean a swift completion of negotiations.
It would ask questions about the compatibility of the degree of economic development, about attitudes towards progress, and about the lack of experience with regard to Community practices of a bureaucracy and political leadership whose attributes were —for various reasons— considered dubious.
The EEC demanded that they unreservedly accept Community uses, allowing a degree of flexibility only during the transition period for legislative transposition and effective completion. In the wake of political change, the EEC implemented its policies with a view to commencing membership negotiations, coinciding with the period of democratic consolidation. Evidently, if a country embraced democracy then membership negotiations could be initiated, but this did not necessarily mean a swift completion of these negotiations.
Spain, for example, was treated like any other European State: Their functions were divided up asymmetrically in a process not without its controversies, contradictions, interests and prejudices. It was a role whose development, it should be stressed, would not be without contradictions, as a consequence of the constant interaction of economic and political, but also institutional and procedural issues, in an area where intergovernmental responsibilities decision making and those of the Community execution of these decisions were brought together.
On the one hand, the regime continued to a great extent to play the victim role, denouncing as intrusion in sovereign affairs any criticism the Community might make of its internal situation, and in a political veto was imposed. This situation served only to demonstrate how complex it was for the dictatorship to shift its level of engagement or disengagement from a bilateral to a multilateral framework like the EEC, presenting as it did a whole range of different interests and attitudes.
This period was characterised by delays in the formulation of negotiating mandates on the part of the Council to the Commission, 42 omissions and silence with respect to matters of interest for Spain, or by declarations with a clear political intention and one-sided actions by the Commission or other member states, with subsequent diplomatic repercussions. However, the Agreement was within the Common Trade Policy and contained nothing which went beyond the area of trade.
For this reason, certain measures, such as those used against Greece in , or those applied to Portugal, could not be adopted against Spain, given that the Agreement made no mention of financial or economic cooperation.
In particular, the question in need of clarification is why the Community failed to seize this opportunity to revoke an agreement which left it at an economic disadvantage and which, from a political point of view, might have aggravated the final crisis of the Franco regime. This decree covered all actions of the opposition to the regime, re-establishing summary Councils of War and the death penalty for anyone committing acts of terror against the State.
All this only served to increase international disapproval and condemnation. The magnitude of the European reaction was no doubt influenced by the widespread conviction that the Franco regime was coming to an end.
On several occasions these degenerated into acts of violence: It is significant that the Swedish Prime Minister, Olof Palme, led the demonstrations in his country and called for financial aid for families of victims of the dictatorship, and for the anti-Franco opposition. In Utrecht, the Dutch prime minister also headed protests against the Franco regime.
Demonstrations took place in many European cities, among the biggest being those held in Milan, Rome, London, Frankfurt and Berlin. Acts of condemnation took place in parliaments, city halls and other public and private institutions in various countries. Nor could there be any doubt about the gravity of the situation at diplomatic level: It was therefore not particularly effective when it came to coordinating a common policy for the Nine against the dictatorship. It did however play a fundamental role in gauging the degree of agreement and the orientation of Community strategy during the crisis.
Its procedures were derived from the ongoing close relationship between Council Ministers and the various EEC foreign ministries, a relationship which made possible the creation of working groups that were to play a key role in the exchange of information and the clarification of collective positions. These proceedings, in the case of third countries like Spain or Portugal, were conducted by diplomatic representations, with regular meetings which took the form of exchanges of information, contact as well as with government and opposition groups.
This common position would influence the definition of a generic position one which would not always be maintained during the first few years on the need to promote and defend democracy, coinciding with a renewed interest in the Mediterranean area which would in due course affect relations with Spain. At first glance, the aim of this declaration appears obvious, and conventionally this is how it has been interpreted At the same time it conveyed its deep unease at the current situation.
It did not go so far as to adopt a position which could be interpreted as interference in Spanish internal affairs, fearing a nationalistic reaction by the regime. However, a more detailed analysis makes the need for additional comment clear.